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ABSTRACT 
The conception following this development is the communication between nodes with the purpose of nodes 
cooperating with a piece of other. The expansion of mean nodes can direct to severe security concern; such nodes 
may interrupt the routing process. In this environment to prevent or detect malicious nodes, an instigation of 
greenhole or collaborative blackhole attack must be a dispute. This issue attempt to declaration by designing a 
Dynamic Routing (DR)-based routing technique, which is referred to as the helpful Bait Detection System (BDS) 
which integrate the compensation of both proactive and reactive security architectures. Our BDS technique 
equipment and knock over tracing performance helps in achieving the fixed target. Finally, the simulation result are 
obtained, appearance of the happening of malicious-node attacks, the BDS outperforms the DSR  network, and 
Adhoc On-Demand Distance Vector(AODV) Routing protocols in terms of mounting packet delivery ratio and 
routing overhead and throughput. 
 
KEYWORDS: Bait Detection Scheme (BDS), Collaborative Blackhole Attacks, Dynamic Routing (DR), Greenhole 
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     INTRODUCTION
In Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET), a group of inter connected nodes which are act as wireless communication 
adapters and form a dynamic network. Every node is acting as router in this network. The unique features of 
MANETs draw a tremendous attention in the cyber and general society. The previous research is based on the 
friendly environment, channel access and multi hop routing but now a day’s security in nodes with a hostile 
environment got a good concern among the user. This article considered the fundamental concept of security 
problem in MANET based on the basic functionality in data delivering. The characteristics like dynamic topology, 
limitations in energy resource, storage device and communication channel threaten the research community to 
develop more and more secure system to prevent the user from data loss and reliability. These MANETs used for 
very secure and important applications such as military emergency operations and preparedness and response 
operations. 
MANETs are categorized into three types based on the features: 
1. All mobile nodes are connected to the fixed internet gateway nodes in Internet based Mobile Adhoc 
Network (I-MANET). This kind of networking is an emerging technology which supports for majorly self 
organized mobile network environment. 
2. A communication maintain between heavy load vehicles by using Vehicular Adhoc Networks (VANET). 
This network is a form of MANET which provides communication among certain range vehicles. Initially 
all the vehicles are equipped with VANET devices to form adhoc Network. In this wireless network, every 
will communicate by using these devices. 
3. Intelligent Vehicular Adhoc Networks (I-VANET) is another type of artificial intelligence which is using 
when collisions, accidents are happened. This network uses WIFI IEEE 802.11 and WiMAX IEEE 802.16 
for simple and efficient communication between vehicle nodes with dynamic mobility feature [5]. 
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MANETs are highly vulnerable to routing attacks because these networks are having the features like mobility, 
dynamic topology. Some of the attacks are like black hole and green hole attacks. A node (called black hole 
node) is broadcasts the malicious information like that having the shortest path to the destination node in black 
hole attack. By this the malicious node will create “fake” shortest route to destination by using forge Route 
Reply (RREP) and attract all the data packets in the network, then discard the data packets without forward to 
its immediate node towards destination node. A node initially not identify as malicious node until it shows its 
own nature in green hole attacks. These nodes are preventing the trust based security from detecting its presence 
in the network.  
Generally Routing protocols are categorized into three types as mentioned below: 
(a) Proactive and Reactive MANET protocols: Proactive MANET protocols keeps on updating network topology 
information constantly ensuring that its available to all the nodes. These protocols reduce network latency and 
increases data overhead by updating routing information constantly. Reactive MANET protocols determine the 
routing paths only when required. Example of reactive protocol is AODV (Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector). 
(b) Hybrid MANET routing protocols: Hybrid MANET protocols are the integration of both reactive and proactive 
MANET protocols. Hybrid protocols combines the advantages of both reactive and proactive protocols result ing in 
better performance protocols that could adjust dynamically to different network conditions.  
(c) High-Level MANET protocols: High-Level MANET protocols automate processes involved in establishing the 
Wi-Fi connection between the mobile devices. allowing them to send and receive messages among them. 
 
Due to the general convenience of mobile devices, Mobile Adhoc NETworks (MANETs) are wide used for 
numerous necessary applications like military predicament operations, emergency preparation and response 
operations. This is often primarily thanks to their infrastructures property. In a MANET, every node not solely 
works as a number however may act as a router. Whereas receiving information, nodes additionally would like 
cooperation with one another to forward the information packets, thereby forming a wireless native space network. 
These nice options additionally accompany serious drawbacks from a security purpose of read.  
 
Indeed, the said applications impose some tight constraint on the safety of the topology, routing, and information 
traffic. For example, the presence and cooperation of malicious nodes within the network might disrupt the routing 
method, resulting in a wrong of the network operations. Several analysis works have centre on the safety of 
MANETs. Most of them manage interference and detection approaches to conflict individual misbehaving nodes. 
During this regard, the effectiveness of that approach becomes weak once multiple malicious nodes conspire along 
to initiate a cooperative attack, which can result to additional shattering damages to the network [3].  
 
The dearth of any infrastructure promotes with the dynamic topology feature of MANETs build these networks 
particularly at risk of routing attacks like blackhole and greenhole (known as variants of blackhole attacks). In 
blackhole attacks a node transmits a malicious broadcast informing that it's the shortest path to the destination, with 
the goal of intercept messages [5]. During this case, a malicious node (so-called blackhole node) will attract all 
packets by persecution cast Route Reply (RREP) packet to incorrectly claim that “fake” shortest route to the 
intention then discard these packets while not forwarding them to the destination. 
 
In greenhole attacks, the malicious node isn't at first recognized per since it turns malicious exclusively at a later 
time, preventing a trust-based safety resolution initial security work its presence within the network. It then by 
selection throw-outs /forwards the information packets once packets undergo it. During this paper, our focus is on 
security work greenhole /collaborative blackhole attacks employing a dynamic routing (DR)-based routing 
technique. DSR involves 2 main processes: route discovery and route preservation. To execute the route discovery 
section, the supply node broadcasts a Route Request (RREQ) packet through the network. The Associate in the 
mean intermediate node has routing data to the destination in its route cache, it'll reply with a RREP to the supplied 
node [8]. Once the RREQ is forwarded to a node, the node adds its address data into the route record within the 
RREQ packet. Once the destination receives the RREQ, it will recognize every treated node’s address among the 
route. The destination node depends on the collected routing data among the packets so as to send a reply RREP 
message to the supply node on the side of the full routing data on the established route. DSR doesn't have any 
detection mechanism. However the supplied node will get all route data regarding the nodes on the route. In our 
approach, we tend to create use of this feature.  
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In this mechanism so-called bait detection system (BDS) is given that effectively detects the malicious nodes that 
conceive to launch greenhole/collaborative blackhole attacks. In our time the address of Associate in adjacent node 
as employed as bait destination address to bait malicious nodes to send a reply RREP message and malicious nodes 
are detected employing a reverse tracing technique. Any detected malicious node is unbroken in an exceedingly 
blackhole list so all alternative nodes that participate to the routing of the message are alerted to prevent 
communication with any node in this list [11]. In contrast to previous works, the benefit of BDS lies within the 
incontrovertible fact that it integrates the proactive and reactive defence architectures to attain the same goal. 
 
In this paper, we explained introduction in Section I, the related work discussed in Section II. We presented the 
poposed approach in Section III, and in Section IV discussed the results analysis. Finally the conclusion and future 
work in section V. 
 
RELATED WORK 
Chin-Feng Lai et al, IEEE (2015). It depicts in solving the issues of blackhole and grayhole attacks caused by 
malicious nodes by designing a Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) mechanism known as Cooperative Bait Detection 
Scheme (CBDS). It combines the advantages of both proactive and reactive detection schemes to detect malicious 
nodes as proactive detection scheme monitors nearby nodes by avoiding attacks in initial stage and reactive 
detection scheme triggers only when detection node detects significant drop in delivery ratio. It achieves its goal 
with Reverse tracing technique. Cooperative Bait Detection scheme is proposed to detect malicious nodes in 
MANET for the grayhole and blackhole attacks.[2] 
Jian-Ming Chang, Po-Chun Tsou,et al, (2015). This paper details Encouraging cooperation and deterring selfish 
behaviours are important for proper operations of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). For this purpose, most 
previous efforts rely on either reputation systems or price systems. However, these systems are neither sufficiently 
effective in providing cooperation incentives nor sufficiently efficient in resource consumption. Nodes in both 
systems can be uncooperative while still being considered trustworthy. Also, information exchange between mobile 
nodes in reputation systems. 
Haiying Shen, Ze Li et al, (2015).  It gives the details of encouraging cooperation and deterring selfish behaviours 
are important for proper operations of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). For this purpose, most previous efforts 
rely on either reputation systems or price systems. However, these systems are neither sufficiently effective in 
providing cooperation incentives nor sufficiently efficient in resource consumption. Nodes in both systems can be 
uncooperative while still being considered trustworthy. Also, information exchange between mobile nodes in 
reputation systems and credit circulation in price systems consumes significant resources. 
 
PROPOSED APPROACH 
The Proposed method is a detection theme referred to as the bait detection theme (BDS) that aims at sleuthing and 
prevents malicious nodes launching the greenhole / collaborative blackhole attacks in MANETs. In our advance, the 
source node stochastically selects associate degree, adjacent node with that to cooperate, within the sense that the 
address of this node is employed as a bait destination address to bait malicious nodes to send a reply RREP message. 
Malicious nodes square measure thereby detected and prevented from taking part within the routing operation, using 
a reverse tracing technique. During this setting, it's assumed that when a major drop happens within the packet 
delivery quantitative relation, an alarm is shipped by the destination node back to the supply node to trigger the 
detection mechanism once more [4]. 
 
Our BDS theme merges the advantage of proactive detection within the initial step and the superiority of reactive 
response at the next steps in order to scale back the resource wastage. BDS is DSR-based. As such, it will establish 
all the addresses of nodes within the chosen routing path from a supply to destination when the supply has received 
the RREP message. However, the supply node might not necessarily be ready to establish which on the intermediate 
nodes has the routing data to the destination or that has the reply RREP message or the malicious node reply solid 
RREP. 
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Figure 1. Blackhole attack–node n4 drops all the data packets. 
This state of affairs could result in having the supply node causing its packets through the pretend shortest path 
chosen by the malicious node, which can then lead to a blackhole attack [3].  
 
To resolve this issue, the operation of a HELLO message is accessory to the BDS to assist every node in 
characteristic that nodes area unit their adjacent nodes inside one hop. This performs assists in causing the bait 
address to lure the malicious nodes and to utilize the reverse tracing program of the BDS to observe the precise 
addresses of malicious nodes. The molestation RREQ packets area a unit almost like the first RREQ packets, except 
that their intention take in hand is that the bait address. The BDS theme contains 3 steps: 1) the initial bait step; 2) 
the initial turn round tracing step; and 3) the shifted to reactive defence step, i.e., the DSR route discovery begin the 
process. The primary step area unit initial proactive defence steps, whereas the third step may be a reactive defence 
step. 
 
Bait initial Step 
The goal of the bait section is to tempt a malicious node to send a reply RREP by causation the bait RREQ that it's 
accustomed advertising itself as having the shortest path to the node that detains the packets that were converted in 
to realize this goal, the subsequent technique is meant to come up with the destination address of the bait RREQ. 
The supply node stochastically selects associate node into adjacent node, inside its one-hop neighbourhood nodes 
and cooperates with this node by taking its address because the destination address of the bait RREQ. Since every 
molestation is completed stochastically and also the adjacent node would be modified if the node affected, the bait 
wouldn't stay unchanged. The bait section is activated whenever the bait RREQ is distributed before seeking the 
initial routing path. The follow-up bait section analysis procedures square measure as follows [2].  
 
First, if the node had not launched a blackhole attack, then when the supplied node had sent out the RREQ, there 
would be different nodes reply RREP additionally to it of the node. This means that the malicious node existed 
within the reply routing thus, the reverse tracing program within the next step would be initiated so as to discover 
this route. If solely the node had sent the reply RREP, it means there was no different malicious node gift within the 
network, which the BDS had initiated the DR route discovery section. Second, it was the malicious node of the 
blackhole attack, then when the supplied node had sent the RREQ, different nodes would have conjointly sent reply 
RREPs. This could indicate that malicious nodes existed within the reply route.  
 
During this case, the reverse tracing program within the next step would be init iated to discover this route. If near 
node deliberately gave no reply RREP, it might be directly listed on the blackhole list by the supplied node. If solely 
the near node had sent a reply RREP, it might mean that there was no different malicious node within the network, 
except the route that had provided during this case, the route discovery section of DR are is started. The route that 
gives won't be listed within the selections provided in the route discovery section. 
 
Shifted to Reactive Defence Phase 
After the on top of initial proactive defence (steps A and B), the DR route discovery method is activated. Once the 
route is established and if at the destination is found that the packet delivery magnitude relation considerably falls to 
the brink, the sight ion theme would be triggered once more to detect for continuous maintenance and time period 
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reaction potency. The brink could be a varied price within the [93%, 98%] which will be adjusted in step with the 
present network potency. The initial threshold price is about to ninetieth. I have gotten designed a dynamic threshold 
rule that controls the time once the packet delivery magnitude relation falls underneath a similar threshold. If the 
downward time is shortened, it implies that the malicious node area unit still gift within the network. In this case, the 
brink ought to be adjusted upward. Otherwise, the brink is going to be lowered [1].  
 
The operations of the BDS area unit captured. It has to be detected that the BDS offers the likelihood to get the 
dubious path data of malicious nodes still as that of sure nodes; thereby, it will determine the sure zone by merely 
watching the malicious nodes reply to each RREP. Additionally, the BDS is capable of observing whether or not a 
malicious node would drop the packets or not. As a result, the proportion of bearing packets is unnoticed, and 
malicious nodes launching a greenhole attack would be detected by the BDS a similar means as those launching 
blackhole attacks area unit detected. 
 
Performance Metrics  
1) Packet Delivery Ratio: Is often outlined because the quantitative relation of the quantity of packets received at 
the destination and the number of packets sent by the make available. Here, pktdi is the number of packets external 
by the intention node with the ith function, and pktsi is that the variety of packets sent by the supply node within the 
ith function. The characteristic packet delivery quantitative relation of the application traffic n, which is denoted by 
PDR, is obtained as 
                                                         PDR=1/n∑ (𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑑𝑖/𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑠𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1                (1)  
2) Routing Overhead: This metric represents the ratio of the amount of routing-related control packet transmissions 
to the amount of data transmissions. Here, cpki is the number of control packets transmitted in the ith function 
traffic, and pkti is the number of data packets transmitted in the ith appliance traffic. The average routing overhead 
of the purpose traffic n, which is denoted by RO, is obtained as  
RO=1/n∑ (𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑖/𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1              (2) 
3) Average End-to-End Delay: This is defined as the common time taken for a packet to be transmitted from the 
source to the destination. The total delay of packets external by the destination node is di, and the quantity of 
packets received by the destination node is pktdi. The average end-to-end delay of the application traffic n, which is 
denote by E, is obtain as 
    E=1/n∑ (𝑑𝑖/𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑑𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1                (3) 
4) Throughput: This is defined as the total of data (bi) that the destinations receive them from the source separated 
by the time (ti) it takes for the destination to get the final packet. The throughput is the numeral of bits transmitted 
per second. The throughput of the application traffic n, which is denoted by T, is obtained as 
                                                  T=1/n∑ (𝑏𝑖/𝑡𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1                        (4) 
First, we tend to study the packet delivery quantitative relation of the BDS and DR for various thresholds once the 
share of malicious nodes within the network varies from third to five hundredth. The most speed of nodes is ready to 
20m/s. Here, the edge price is ready to half of one mile, 96%, and also the action threshold, severally. The results 
capture in Fig. 6, may be ascertained that DR drastically suffers from blackhole attacks once the share of malicious 
nodes will increase. This can be attributed tothe actual fact that DR has no secure technique for detecting/ preventing 
blackhole attacks [3]. 
 
Our BDS theme shows the next packet deliverance quantitative relation compared there upon of DR. Even within 
the case wherever four-hundredth of the entire nodes within the network are malicious, the BDS theme still with 
success detects those malicious nodes whereas keeping the packet delivery quantitative relation higher than 
ninetieth. A threshold of ninety fifth would then end in earlier route detection than once the edge is eighty nine or is 
ready for the dynamic threshold price. Thus, the packet delivery quantitative relation once employing a threshold of 
ninety fifth is beyond that obtained once employing a threshold of eighty fifth or the dynamic threshold. 
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Figure 2.Flow chart for Operations of the BDS 
 
Second, we tend to study the routing overhead of the BDS and DR for various thresholds. It may be ascertain that 
once the amount of malicious nodes will increase, DR produces all-time low routing overhead compared with the 
BDS. This can be attributed to the actual fact that DSR has no intrinsic security technique or defensive mechanism. 
In fact, the routing overhead created by the BDS for various thresholds may be a little beyond that created by DSR 




NS2 is an open- source simulation tool that runs on Linux. It is a discrete event simulator targeted at networking 
research and provides substantial support for simulation of routing, multicast protocols and IP protocols, such as 
UDP, TCP over wired and wireless (local and satellite) networks. It has many advantages that make it a useful tool, 
such as support for multiple protocols and the capability of graphically detailing network traffic. 
 
Figure 3. Communication for source node to designations node using MANET 
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Figure 4. BDS approach in various level of energy comparison 
 
It can be observed that when the percentage of malicious nodes increases, DR produces the lowest routing overhead 
compared with all other schemes including the BDS. The BDS is able to achieve proactive detection in the initial 
stage and then change into reactive response in the later stage. Through this feature, the advantage of proactive 
detection and the superiority of reactive response can be merged to reduce the waste of resource. So the energy level 
is reduced to the source node and the designation node packet transfer power value is efficient. 
 
Figure 5. greenhole and blackhole attack for packet drop 
 
Figure 5 shows the variation of Packet Drop Ratio (PDR) with malicious node ratios for Denial of Service (DOS) 
attack. The Packet drop ratio is the ratio of the number of delivered data packets to the destination. This illustrates 
the level of drop the packet to the destination. The greater value of the packet drop ratio is reduced means the better 
performance of the protocol. 
 
Figure 6. Throughput vs. malicious node ratio for DOS attack 
 
Figure 6 represents the variation of throughput with change in the malicious node ratio in case of DOS attack. 
Throughput is the rate of successful message delivery over a communication channel. Higher the throughput, better 
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is the protocol. The throughput is low in case of ideal condition. RCA raises the value of throughput which is further 
increased by BDS. The throughput after BDS however, shows a variable trend (it is lower than the throughput value 
before implementing BDS in some cases while in another it is higher). This too remains an area for further 
improvement. 
 
Figure7. PDR vs. greenhole node ratio for blackhole attacks 
 
Figure 7 shows the variation of Packet Delivery Ratios (PDR) with greenhole node ratio for black hole attacks. The 
Packet delivery ratio is the ratio of the number of delivered data packets to the destination. This illustrates the level 
of delivered data to the destination. The greater value of packet delivery ratio means the better performance of the 
protocol. 
PDR = Σ Number of packet receive / Σ Number of packet sent  (5) 
 
CONCLUSION 
It has been analyzed that the protection threats associate degree of ad-hoc network facing and it gives the protection 
objective that requires to be achieved so that the security data application of associate degree ad-hoc networks 
should have a high degree of security. On the opposite hand ad-hoc network are inherently susceptible to precaution 
attacks and are desired to form the network safer and stronger to adapt the hard necessities. The pliability ease and 
speed with these networks are often originated involving their gain wider function. This leaves Ad-hoc networks 
wide open for analysis to satisfy the hard applications. The analysis on painter security remains in its early stage to 
the present proposals and are generally attacked-oriented. They determine many security threats which enhance the 
present protocol or propose a replacement protocol to prevent such threats. The results of the solutions are designed 
expressly with the BDS technique combined with each proactive and reactive detection scheme which reinforces its 
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